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Bassi: Restricting Miranda

NOTES

RESTRICTING THE MIRANDA
PRESUMPTION AND PRUNING THE
POISONOUS TREE: OREGON V. ELST AD
I.

INTRODUCTION

In March, 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Oregon v.
Elstad. 1 The Supreme Court held that a second confession was
admissible into evidence despite the fact that a first unMirandized custodial confession was obtained a short time earlier.2 Although the initial unwarned confession was suppressed
pursuant to Miranda, 3 the Court refused to extend the Miranda
presumption of coercion to the second confession. 4 The second
confession was admissible because the Court found that the defendant, after being advised of his rights, had voluntarily waived
those rights. II According to the Court, the initial violation of Miranda was technical or inadvertant;6 therefore, the violation did
not taint the subsequent Mirandized confession.? Furthermore,
the Court established that the conditionS that was created by
the technical violation of Miranda was cured9 when the police
officers administered thorough Miranda warnings to the accused
and he waived his rights. 10
1. 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).

2. Id. at 1296.
3. Id. at 1293.
4. Id. at 1292.
5. Id. at 1293.
6. Id. at 1296-97.
7. [d. at 1298.
8. In Elstad, the technical violation of Miranda was deemed a condition as opposed
to an illegality. Id. at 1296. Thorough Miranda warnings would ordinarily cure this condition.ld.
9. See supra note 8.
10. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1294.
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The Elstad decision is significant because the Court eliminated the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine l l with regard to
Miranda violations, if the secondary evidence is a subsequent
confession. 12 As a result of Elstad, before a court will apply the
derivative evidence rule 13 to the secondary evidence,14 a suspect
11. The fruit of the poisonous tree, or derivative evidence doctrine, was established
in Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). In Silverthorne,
the Court ruled that evidence obtained through a constitutional violation could not be
used in court, and moreover, the evidence obtained could not be used in any way. [d. at
392. The Court did not want the government to profit from its own wrongdoing. If the
government were allowed to use evidence obtained as an exploitation of a constitutional
violation, then the exclusionary rule would lose much, if not all, of its force and the
fourth amendment would be reduced to a "form of words." [d. The crux of the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine is the determination that a defendant's constitutional rights
have been violated; this decision will allow suppression of evidence obtained through an
exploitation of the violation. [d.
There are certain exceptions to the derivative evidence rule. One exception, the independent source doctrine, was established in Silverthorne. Id. If the government can
obtain the secondary evidence independently of the primary violation of a defendant's
rights, then the evidence may be admitted into evidence. Id. "If knowledge of [the secondary evidence) is gained from an independent source [the secondary evidence] may be
proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed." Id.
Seventeen years later, the Court established the attenuation theory in Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1937). This theory was based upon the proximity of the
secondary evidence, which the defendant sought to have excluded, to the primary violation of his fourth amendment rights. If the secondary evidence obtained through the
primary violation does not have a causal connection to the primary violation of the rights
of the defendant, then the taint of the primary violation is attenuated and the secondary
evidence is admissible. Id. at 341. The issue was whether the secondary evidence had
come by exploitation of the primary violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. [d.
at 340-41. Over the years, the attenuation theory has been refined to a number of factors
to be viewed in determining if the secondary evidence has a causal connection to the
primary violation. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.s. 590 (1975). These factors include: the temporal proximity between the original violation and the secondary evidence, the presence
or absence of intervening events, and particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Id. at 603-04.
Thirty·seven years after Nardone, the Court established the final exception to the
derivative evidence rule-the inevitable discovery theory. Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct.
2501 (1984). In Nix, evidence that the police would have discovered anyway, as the result
of an ongoing police investigation, was admissible despite the fact that a primary violation of the defendant's rights led to the secondary evidence. Id. at 2511-12. The idea was
to put the parties in the same position that they would have been in without the primary
illegality. This is accomplished by not setting aside convictions that would have been
obtained even without police misconduct. [d. at 2509. "Suppression, in these circumstances, [inevitable discovery] would do nothing whatever to promote the integrity of the
trial process, but would inflict a wholly unacceptable burden on the administration of
justice." Id. at 2511.
12. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1295.
13. See supra note 11.
14. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1294.
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in custody must prove there was actual coercion l5 by the police
when they obtained the initial statement. This Note will discuss
the Elstad decision and the impact it will have on criminal
procedure.
II.

BACKGROUND

In 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the historic Miranda case. IS This decision afforded lower courts, struggling with
the admission of confessions on a case-by-case, totality of the
circumstances basis, a clear standard for determining if a confession was admissible. 17 According to Miranda, if a defendant is in
15. Id. at 1296.
16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). At issue in Miranda was whether a
confessiun, that the police obtained from a suspect in custody through interrogation
techniques without advising the defendant of his rights, was voluntary. Id. On March 13,
1963, the petitioner, Ernest Miranda was arrested and taken into custody for kidnapping
and rape. At trial, the police officers admitted that the petitioner was not advised of his
rights. Id. at 491. The confession contained a statement that the confession was voluntary, and that the petitioner fully understood his legal rights. Id. at 492. The Supreme
Court reversed the finding that Miranda had voluntarily confessed and that he had
waived his rights. Id. The Court determined that the conduct of the police in obtaining
the waiver and confession did not approach the constitutional standards necessary for a
knowing and intelligent waiver. Id.
17. In the United States, the original rules of confession admissibility precluded the
use of a confession as evidence if it was obtained through torture or other means of
compulsory self-incrimination. O. STEPHENS. THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF
GUILT 22-23 (1973). The rationale was that if such means were employed, the confession
was not trustworthy. Id. Next, the courts utilized a voluntariness test that was the precursor to the modern voluntariness test. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584 (1884). Subsequently, confession analysis moved away from the voluntary test and courts began to
view the police methods in obtaining the confession in question. Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278 (1936); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940). The police methods test was
instituted in response to flagrant police abuse while the police interrogated black men
accused of rape in the South. Id. Then, confession analysis gradually started to turn back
to the voluntary test. The Supreme Court started to utilize an "inherently coercive" test.
If the circumstances surrounding the confession were inherently coercive, the confession
was inadmissible. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944). The basic idea was to preserve the integrity of the fact-finding system. Id.
In most cases, police interrogation techniques had developed from crude forms of
physical abuse of the 1930's to subtle psychological questioning. Miranda, 384 U.S. at
448. A court faced with the question of admissibility of a confession was in a difficult
position. How was a court to measure the psychological impact upon a defendant in
determining whether a confession was coerced, and thus, not trustworthy? In response to
this dilemma, the Supreme Court developed a two-prong analysis; the Court viewed the
trustworthiness of the confession and the police methods in obtaining the confession to
determine if the confession was admissible. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
In 1963, the Court moved away from the two-prong test and again began to utilize a
voluntary, due process test. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Haynes v. Washing-
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custody 18 and interrogated,i9 "the prosecution may not use
statements ... unless it demonstrate[s] the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination."20 The states must employ a fully effective means of apprising a defendant of his constitutional rights. 21 Unless these
rights are scrupulously honored, a defendant must be advised of
his rights in the well-known Miranda warnings. 22 A suspect in
custody may not be interrogated unless he is advised of his Miranda rights; he must fully understand his rights,23 and he must
freely, knowingly, and voluntarily waive these rights. If the dictates of the Miranda warnings are violated by a suspect's interrogators, the statements obtained during the interrogation are
irrebuttably presumed coerced; therefore, the statements are
inadmissible into evidence because there has been a violation of
ton, an u.s. 503 (1963). A confession was admissible if it was deemed voluntary based
upon the total facts of the case. [d. at 513. The problem with the voluntary test was that
the courts were continually litigating the question of voluntariness, and the inevitable
swearing contest with regard to the facts was usually resolved in favor of the police. O.
STEPHENS. supra, at 10-11 (1973). Another problem with the voluntariness test was that
coercion and involuntariness were state of the art terms. The normal dictionary meaning
of the words did not apply. A defendant was required to show a greater level of coercion
than was actually needed to show the confession was compelled within the meaning of
the privilege against self-incrimination. Kamisar, Heavy Blow Delivered By Miranda Deci.~i()ns, 7 NAT'L L.J. 51 (Sept. 2, 1985). Thus, there was a gap in confessions law. A
defendant may have been coerced within the meaning of the fifth amendment but not
within the meaning of the voluntary test. In response, the Court adopted the Miranda
safeguard to ensure that a defendant's fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination
were honored.
18. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1977). A defendant is in custody for
purposes of Miranda if he is actually in police custody or if he is deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way. [d.
19. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). A defendant is interrogated
for purposes of Miranda if he is subject to express questioning or its functional
equivalent. [d. The functional equivalent of express questioning is words or actions on
the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from a defendant, within the meaning of Miranda. [d. at 301.
20. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
21. [d. The Court did not require the police to use the Miranda warnings as set out
in the opinion. [d. But the Court did mandate that the warnings should be used if the
states could not devise a method of warning that would ensure that the right against
self-incrimination would be fully honored. [d.
22. [d. The full set of warnings that the Supreme Court prescribed are: (1) a suspect
in custody has the right to remain silent, (2) a suspect has the right to know that anything he says will be used against him, (3) a suspect has the right to an attorney before
any questioning can take place, and (4) a suspect will be provided with a court-appointed
attorney if the suspect cannot afford one. [d.
23. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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the suspect's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. 24
The fundamental premise of Miranda is that a defendant
does not have to prove actual coercion to take advantage of the
exclusionary rule. 211 In contrast, the main point of Elstad is that
a defendant must prove actual coercion before a court will apply
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to exclude any secondary
evidence;26 the Miranda presumption of coercion does not apply
to the secondary evidence. 27
In Elstad, the petitioner, Michael Elstad, was implicated in
a burglary of a neighbor's residence. 1I8 The police obtained a
warrant for Elstad's arrest and proceeded to his house to arrest
him.29 The policemen were admitted into the house by Elstad's
mother.30 While one policeman sequestered the mother in the
kitchen, the other officer questioned Elstad in the living room. 31
Elstad was not given the requisite Miranda warnings. 32 The officer told Elstad that he was implicated in the burglary of his
neighbor's residence. 33 In response, Elstad made damaging admissions concerning his involvement in the crime. 34 The police
then arrested 311 Elstad and transported him to the police station. 36 At the police station, approximately one hour after the
initial questioning, the police thoroughly warned Elstad of his
Miranda rights.37 Elstad waived his rights and made a second
confession shortly thereafter. 38 The trial court suppressed the
initial unwarned statement pursuant to Miranda 39 but, based
24. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
25. Id. at 478-79.

26. Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1296 (1985).
27. Id. at 1293.
28. Id. at 1289.
29.Id.
30.Id.
31. Id.
32.Id.
33.Id.
34. Id. Elstad responded to the police officer's statement that he was involved in the

robbery of his neighbor's house by saying, "Yes, I was there." [d.
35. For the purpose of this appeal, the state conceeded the issue of custody even
though Michael Elstad had not been placed under formal arrest at the time of his first
statement. [d. at 1297.
36. Id. at 1289.
37. Id.

38. [d.
39. Id. at 1289-90.
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upon the significance of the second confession, Elstad was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison for his participation
in the burglary.40
The Oregon Court of Appeals determined that the second
confession was the fruit of the first unwarned confession, and
therefore, could not have been a truly voluntary confession. 41
The first confession let the "cat out of the bag,""2 and there no
longer was any reason for Elstad to remain silent. 43 As a result,
the court applied the derivative evidence rule, and excluded the
second confession as a fruit of the first unwarned admission.""
According to the court of appeals, the violation of Miranda was
a constitutional violation against the fifth amendment's prohibition against self-incrimination. 41i Therefore, the court applied
the derivative evidence rule and excluded the second confession
from evidence."6 The Oregon Supreme Court denied certiorari
and the state appealed to the United States Supreme Court."7
III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION
In Elstad, the Supreme Court distinguished an actual violation of a defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination from a violation of the prophylactic Miranda warnings
designed to ensure that these rights are fully honored. 48 This
distinction is the fundamental premise of Elstad."9 "The prophylactic Miranda warnings are not themselves rights, protected
40. [d.
41. State v. Elstad, 61 Or. App. 673, 658 P.2d 552, cert. denied, 295 Or. 61.7, 670
P.2d 1033 (1983).
42. This meta:Jhor was first used in Bayer v. United States, 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
The Court held that a second confession is not per se inadmissible simply because a first
confession was illegal. [d. at 540-41. The Court stated that a second confession will almost always be the product of the first, but in this factual setting the second confession
was attenuated, and thus, admissible. [d. The second confession was admissible if it was
attenuated, even though, in a literal sense, it would always be the product of the first
confession. [d.
43. State v. Elstad, 61 Or. App. at 677, 658 P.2d at 555.
44. [d. at 676, 658 P.2d at 554. According to the Supreme Court, a violation of a
defendant's constitutional rights is a prerequisite of the fruits doctrine. Elstad, 105 S.
Ct. at 1291.
45. State v. Elstad, 61 Or. App. at 676, 658 P.2d at 554.
46. [d. at 677, 658 P.2d at 554.
47. Oregon v. Elstad, 104 S. Ct. 1437 (1984).
48. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1291-92.
49. Id. at 1291.
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by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that
the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected."lIo
The Court provided several reasons for this distinction.
First, the Miranda exclusionary rule is broader than the fifth
amendment. III A defendant may take advantage of the Miranda
presumption even in the absence of actual coercion by the police
in obtaining an unwarned statement;1I2 the un warned statement
is irrebuttably presumed coercedCi3 and excluded from evidence
without regard to the issue of voluntariness. 1I4 The Miranda rule
was implemented to ensure that a defendant's rights are protected from the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial
interrogation. 1111
Second, the dual rationale of the fruits doctrine, trustworthiness and deterrence,1I6 are not furthered by the extension of
the Miranda presumption. 1I7 The police are not deterred; there is
nothing to deter because the violation of Miranda was technical
and inadvertant. Both statements were voluntary, and therefore,
trustworthy; the first because there was no actual coercion, and
the second because of the thorough Miranda warnings and subsequent waiver. Therefore, because the deterrent purpose of the
fifth amendment will not be furthered by an extension of the
Miranda presumption, the Court restricted the use of this presumption to the initial unwarned statement. 1I6
Third, the Court reasoned that it would be an "unwarranted
and improvident" extension of Miranda to allow a person who is
not the victim of actual coercion to take advantage of the broad
fruits exclusionary rule. 1I9 The fact-finder should not be deprived
of highly probative secondary evidence of a voluntary confession. 60 Moreover, the cost to legitimate law enforcement would
50. Id. (quoting New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984)).
51. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1292.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1293-94.
54.Id.

55. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-58 (1966).
56. See supra note 17.
57. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1293.
58. Id. at 1298.
59. Id. at 1293-94.
60. [d. at 1295.
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be too high, and would add little to a defendant's interest
against self-incrimination. 61 A defendant, in order to come
within the reach of the exclusion of the fruits doctrine, cannot
rely solely upon a violation of Miranda to trigger the rule. 62
Rather, a defendant must show there was actual compulsion by
the police in obtaining the initial statement under the due process voluntary test. 63 Whether the violation was technical or flagrant will be just one factor in a court's due process voluntary
analysis. 64
Therefore, under this rationale, a prophylactic violation of
the Miranda rules raises a presumption that only the initial unwarned custodial confession was coerced. 611 For purposes of the
derivative evidence rule, the courts should look behind the procedural violation and determine if the initial statement was voluntary.66 If the statement is deemed voluntary, then there was
no primary illegality and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
is inapplicable. 67 Thorough Miranda warnings would ordinarily68
be sufficient to cure69 the condition70 that was created through
the inadvertant questioning of a defendant in custody.71 Thus,
the only issues that remain are whether the suspect was advised
of his Miranda rights, and whether he made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights before his second confession. 72
A court faced with a derivative evidence objection based
upon a Miranda violation must analyze the case according to the
test set forth in Elstad. 73 Initially, the court must determine if
the violation of Miranda was technical or flagrant. Then, if the
violation is deemed technical, unless the police deliberately co61. [d.
62. [d.
63. Id. at 1294. Due process is violated if a defendant involuntarily confesses. The

courts have stressed the unfairness of interrogators overcoming the will of a defendant.
Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 867 (1980-81).
64. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1298.
65. Id. at 1292-93.
66. Id. at 1293-94.
67.Id.
68. See supra note 8.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

[d.
[d.
Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1294.
Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1298.
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erced the suspect or used improper tactics in obtaining the first
confession, the court will consider the statement voluntary."
Since the initial statement was voluntary, there was no primary
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights and the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine will not apply.711 The second statement will then be viewed strictly according to Miranda. 76 If the
defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and he voluntarily
waived those rights, then the second statement will be admissible." However, if the initial violation of Miranda is deemed flagrant, the analysis will be different.78 The flagrancy of the violation will weigh heavily in the determination of whether the
initial statement was voluntary.79 If the initial statement is
deemed coerced, then the derivative evidence rule will be applied to the second warned statement. 80 Thus, the new test eliminates the use of the Miranda presumption of coercion if the
issue is admission of secondary evidence obtained in violation of
Miranda.
IV. ANALYSIS

In Elstad, the Court minimized the psychological impact of
initial unwarned admissions upon subsequent confessions with
regard to the issue of voluntariness. 81 "[T]he causal connection
between any psychological disadvantage created by [a suspect's]
admission and his ultimate decision to cooperate is speculative
and attenuated at best. "82 In lightly dismissing the psychological
effect of a first confession, the Court disregarded reality.83 A person who confesses may feel that he has nothing to lose and continues to talk. 84 He may even feel that if he cooperates further,
he will obtain favored treatment. Skillful interrogators are
74. [d.

75. [d. at
[d. at
[d. at
[d. at

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

1293.
1296.
1294.
1296.

[d.
[d. at 1293.

81. [d. at 1295-96.
82. [d. at 1296.
83. [d. at 1305 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

84. Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 350-51 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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trained to capitalize on this breakdown of a suspect's defenses. 811
In addition, the Court ignored precedent when it denied the effect of the first confession on the second confession. 88 Prior decisions have established that the second confession will always, in
some manner, be the product of the first confession. 87
Additionally, the Elstad Court feared that if it recognized
the psychological effect of a voluntary unwarned admission on a
suspect, with regard to subsequent confessions, the police would
be precluded from obtaining statements from that suspect. 88
"[E]ndowing the psychological effects of voluntary unwarned admissions with constitutional implications would, practically
speaking, disable the police from obtaining the suspect's informed cooperation even when the official coercion proscribed by
the fifth amendment played no part in either his warned or unwarned confessions. "89
The Court's fear was illusory. This disabling effect has
never been the case, even for the most egregious fifth amendment violations of the right against self-incrimination. 90 The elements of attenuation91 can cure even the most blatant violation
of a defendant's constitutional rights. 9a The sliding scale of at-

s.

85. Elstad, 105
Ct. at 1303-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947). In Bayer, Bayer bribed an
army officer to keep Bayer from being shipped overseas to combat duty. Id. at 534-35.
The army officer was convicted solely upon his confession. Subsequently, the army officer's conviction was overturned because the confession was ruled inadmissible. Id. at
539-40. However, he was tried and convicted again based upon the strength of a second
confession that was obtained six months after the first. Id. at 540. The court of appeals
determined that the second confession was the fruit of the first, and therefore, was inadmissible. Id. The Supreme Court reversed and decided that although the first confession
let the "cat out of the bag" and that the second confession would always in some way be
the product of the first confession, sufficient time had passed and the army officer was
not coerced. Therefore, the second confession was voluntary and admissible. Id. at 54041.

87.Id.
88. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1294-95.
89. Id. at 1294.
90. See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944). In Lyons, the police forced a murder suspect to confess during intensive interrogation. Id. at 599-600. The police interrogated the suspect for over eight consecutive hours. Id. There was evidence that the police
beat the suspect and placed a pan containing the bones of the victim in front of the
suspect. [d. The defendant's first confession was ruled inadmissible but the Court asserted that the coercive effects of the first confession would be dissipated with time. Id.
at 603-04.
91. See supra note 11.
92.Id.
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tenuation 93 is well adapted to deal with constituti6nal violations
at either end of the spectrum, whether technical violations or
flagrant violations. 94 Therefore, the Elstad decision should have
been premised upon an attenuation analysis instead of upon a
Miranda analysis. 95 The Court should have viewed the facts to
determine if the second confession was attenuated. The Court
could have analyzed the facts of Elstad as follows: (1) was the
violation of Miranda technical or flagrant?, (2) how much time
passed between the initial confession and the second confession?, (3) were the same officers involved?, (4) was the accused
moved from one place to another?, (5) were thorough Miranda
warnings given before the second confession?, and (6) did the
defendant waive his rights?
Based upon these factors the Court could have decided the
case strictly according to established precedent. 98 If the Court
would have relied upon prior cases, it would not have had to
disregard the real impact that first confessions have upon subsequent admissions. 97 The purpose of the Miranda presumption
would have been preserved, and the deterrence and trustworthiness rationales of the derivative evidence rule would have been
furthered.
Moreover, the Court's analysis was much different than a
similar analysis for a fourth amendment violation. 98 The Court
previously held that if the fruit of a fourth amendment violation
was a confession, Miranda warnings alone do not remove the
taint from the violation. 99 On the contrary, the Miranda warnings will be just one factor in the analysis of attenuation. loo
However, as established in Elstad, when the initial violation is a
technical violation of Miranda, Miranda warnings have a greater
ability to cure the taint on the investigatory process. lOl Significantly, the very same warnings that were used to protect a defendant's rights against self-incrimination were used to ensure
93. [d.

94. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1307-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. [d. at 1307.
96. [d.
97. [d. at 1305.
98. [d. at 1292.

99. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975).
100. [d.
101. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1294.
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that any subsequent statement would be used against him.l02
Unfortunately, the Elstad Court's analysis undermines the
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. The Court's
decision disregards the fact that suspects often believe they will
be convicted because of their initial confession,103 and therefore,
they are more likely to make subsequent damaging statements. 104 The Court's use of these additional incriminating
statements effectively weakens a defendant's right against selfincrimination. lOG It is ironic that the Court has used the Miranda warnings, designed to ensure that fifth amendment rights
are fully honored,108 to limit a suspect's constitutional
protection.
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The initial effect of the Elstad decision is the elimination of
the derivative evidence rule with regard to Miranda violations
when the secondary evidence is a subsequent warned confession. l07 Elstad and cases that have preceded it have paved the
way for the total elimination of the fruits doctrine when there is
a Miranda violation. lOS In Michigan u. Tucker,109 the Court held
that a technical violation of Miranda does not warrant application of the derivative evidence rule when the secondary evidence
is a third party witness. After Elstad, the Court has one final
step to eliminate the derivative evidence rule with regard to Miranda violations; that step is to determine that physical evidence is not tainted as a result of a technical Miranda violation.1l0 Since the Elstad Court applied the Tucker analysis, I I I
102. [d.
103. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
104. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. [d. at 1313-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
107. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1296.
108. [d. at 1313 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). In Tucker, a witness was discovered as a result of questioning that violated Miranda. The witness was not considered a fruit of the violation of
the defendant's constitutional rights because the violation of Miranda was only a violation of the procedural safeguards of Miranda. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444-45. Therefore,
there was no constitutional violation, and the secondary evidence rule did not apply. [d.
110. The Court used a three step analysis when it developed the fruits doctrine for
fourth amendment violations. In Silverthorne, the Court established the rule with regard
to physical evidence. Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
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the Court, when faced with physical evidence as the fruit of a
technical Miranda violation, will apply Tucker, and allow the
physical evidence to be admitted.l12
Justice Brennan dissented in Elstad, and voiced this concern. ll3 He was fearful that the Court would foreclose application of the derivative evidence rule in all instances of a technical
violation of a Miranda warning.1I4 He attempted to distinguish
the holdings of Tucker and Elstad. llCi According to Justice Brennan, the majority in both decisions heavily relied upon the extent of a suspect's volition in successive confession cases and
third party witness cases. 1I6 If a suspect retains his individual
volition, the second confession or testimony will be insulated
from the taint of the unwanted admissions.1l7 The fact that a
person can exercise his free will to testify or confess was an important factor to the Elstad and Tucker Courts. liS As noted by
Justice Brennan, this insulating factor is absent in cases In
which the fruit of the poisonous tree is physical evidence.lIs
Nevertheless, the Elstad majority asserted that a violation
of the prophylactic rules of Miranda, alone, is never a constitutional violation. 120 This premise will be rigidly followed by the
Court, and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, with regard
to violations of the procedural rules of Miranda, will be eliminated; all secondary evidence will be admissible.lU As a result,
the courts will be forced to revert to the factual, case-by-case
inquiry of voluntariness before they will apply the derivative evidence rule to a violation of Miranda. 122
(1920). In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Court extended the doctrine to verbal evidence. [d. at 484-87. In United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978),
the Court ruled that a third party witness may be excluded as a fruit of a constitutional
violation if the defendant can show there was a very direct link to the violation. [d. at
280.
111. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1291.
112. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
113. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1299 n.2, 1313 n.29 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. [d.
115. [d. at 1313 n.29.
116. [d.
117. [d.
118. [d.
119. [d.
120. [d. at 1294.
121. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
122. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1324 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The majority's decisions in this area tend to preserve the
status of Miranda but to restrict its expansion. The Court is still
adhering to the guidelines of the Miranda presumption but it is
refusing to extend the decision in any direction. 123 For example,
in New York v. Quarles,12. Justice O'Connor stated, "[W]here
the accused only proves that the police failed to administer Miranda warnings, exclusion of the statement itself is all that will
and should be required."126
The ultimate impact of Elstad, is that it may lead to the
eventual overruling of Miranda. 126 The Court took the first step
in that direction when it distinguished between actual coercion
and presumed coercion.127 Under this distinction, the Miranda
warnings are prophylactic rules, and are not constitutionally
necessary;128 the Constitution simply requires an absence of actual coercion in obtaining a confession. 129 Since the Miranda
warnings only raise a presumption of coercion, they are not constitutionally mandated,130 and therefore, can be eliminated.
Statements obtained by the police in violation of Miranda will
no longer be presumed coerced. Miranda warnings may still be
required, but their presence or absence will be only one factor in
determining if a confession has been obtained through actual co123. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the Supreme Court refused to
extend the Miranda presumption to exclude evidence obtained in violation of Miranda
that was used for impeachment purposes. [d. at 226. In addition, the Quarles Court fashioned the only real exception to the Miranda safeguards. 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). In
Quarles, the Court allowed evidence obtained in violation of Miranda to be used in the
case in chief against the defendant basing its decision on the compelling need of public
and police safety. [d. at 2632-33.
124. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (O'Connor, J., dissenting and concurring). In Quarles,
the police apprehended a suspected rapist. The victim had informed the police that the
suspect was carrying a gun. The police searched the suspect and found a shoulder holster
but did not find a gun. The officers, before administering the required Miranda warnings, asked the suspect where the gun was; the suspect complied. The Court allowed the
statement of the suspect into evidence based upon a public safety exception to Miranda.
[d. at 2632. The Court held that if a police officer is motivated by a genuine concern for
public safety then that need outweighs the requirement that the officer administer Miranda warnings before questioning the suspect. [d. at 2633.
125. [d. at 2641 (emphasis added).
126. See Kamisar, supra note 17, at S22.
127. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
128. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1291 (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181,
187 (1977)).
129. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1292.
130. [d.
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ercion. The analysis will be similar to the analysis of Elstad;ISI
was there actual, not presumed, coercion in obtaining the initial
statement. If there was no actual coercion, the statement will be
admissible.
.
If the Court overrules Miranda and reverts to the voluntary

test, a curious use of the Miranda warnings may occur. Miranda
warnings may still be required, but the presumption of coercion
will not apply. However, a different presumption may result.
The presumption will not be of coercion, but of voluntariness.
The courts will view Miranda warnings as an extra effort to ensure that any confession obtained was voluntary. A defendant
will have to overcome this presumption and prove that a confession was obtained through actual coercion. This turn of events
will be an interesting use of the presumption that was intended
to ensure that a suspect's right against self-incrimination has
been fully honored.
In light of the decision in Elstad, a significant question remains to be answered. What impact will the decision have on
the deterrence rationale of the Miranda presumption and the
fruits doctrine? The police may utilize the Elstad decision to authorize inadvertant questioning of a suspect, in violation of Miranda, with the hope of obtaining secondary information that
may be more valuable than obtaining a conviction for the original violation. This is a real concern. lS2 One does not have to
search far to find examples of police conduct designed to take
advantage of a legal doctrine.
One example is the use of the plain view doctrine as a pretext for a general search. ISS In Sanderson v. Superior Court of
Stanislaus County/s. police officers attempted to manipulate
the use of the doctrine by moving a defendant from room to
room while they questioned him, with the hope of finding evidence in plain view. lsil It is not difficult to imagine a resourceful
131. [d. at 1296.
132. [d. at 1318-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. If the police are lawfully in a certain place and inadvertantiy view evidence of a

crime, they may lawfully seize evidence that is in plain view. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Moreover, the Court asserted that the use of the plain view
doctrine may not be used as a pretext for a general exploratory search. [d. at 466.
134. 105 Cal. App. 3d 264, 273, 164 Cal. Rptr. 290, 296 (1980).
135. [d.
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police officer attempting to utilize the Elstad precedent in a similar manner. For example, a police officer, intent upon arresting
a suspect, may "inadvertently" question him in the non-threatening environment of the suspect's home. ls6 If the suspect answers, the reply will be inadmissible pursuant to Miranda, but
any subsequent Mirandized admission due to the suspect's
weakened state will be admissible. IS?
The first admission is always the hardest admission for interrogators to obtain. ls8 If the police are permitted to obtain the
initial statement in violation of Miranda without fear of the
fruits doctrine, then the deterrence rationale of the fifth amendment will be substantially impaired, and the decisions in Elstad
and Tucker will not have served their purpose.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE COURT'S HOLDING
There were two possible alternatives to the Court's solution
to the procedural violation of the prophylactic rules designed to
safeguard Elstad's fifth amendment rights. The first alternative
was to decide the case strictly according to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine by applying the doctrine of attenuation. lSB
If Miranda was violated, there was a primary illegality and the
courts should look to the factors of attenuation in determining
the admissibility of any secondary evidence. ao The deterrence
rationale of the exclusionary rule would be preserved, and criminal procedure would remain relatively straight forward with regard to fifth amendment violations. al
The second alternative was to require the police officers to
give supplemental information to Elstad explaining that his first
statement was made without proper Miranda warnings, and
therefore, might be inadmissible in court against him. a2 In this
136.
137.
138.
139.

Elstad. 105 S. Ct. at 1289.
[d. at 1296.
[d. at 1303-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See supra note 11.

140. [d.

141. Justice Stevens voiced this concern in his dissent. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1324
(Stevens, J., dissenting). He was afraid that if the Court reverted to the use of the voluntary test. the Court would be forced into the factual inquiries of voluntariness that Miranda avoided. [d.
142. The defendant in Elstad advanced this argument which was expressly rejected
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way, Elstad could have voluntarily waived his right to remain
silent after receiving the proper warnings. He would have had all
the essential information necessary to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. 143
The psychological impact in cases of consecutive confessions, when one confession closely follows the other confession,
is magnified, so that the second confession can never be voluntary in the non coercive sense. 1. . The first confession is itself coercive in the mind of a suspect;141i Miranda warnings alone cannot cure the coercive impact of the first confession. A simple
additional warning to the thorough Miranda admonition that
the previous statement may not be admissible, will cure this defect. Therefore, any additional statement will be a voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent waiver of a defendant's constitutional
rights. 146
The Miranda warnings are well known and relatively simple. A supplemental warning; will not detract from this simplicity. The rights of an accused will be scrupulously honored
and the burden on law enforcement will be minimal. Anything
less than supplemental warnings will not be sufficient, and will
undermine the integrity of the fact finding system.
147

VII. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court has created a new area of criminal
procedure that will burden the courts with tedious fact-finding
litigation whenever the police discover evidence as a result of a
Miranda violation. A primary confession will be inadmissible,
pursuant to Miranda, but any secondary statement will have to
be examined according to the factors in Elstad. Was the initial
confession voluntary according to the old due process voluntary
test? If the answer is yes, then there has been no primary violation of the rights of the defendant and the derivative evidence
doctrine is inapplicable; therefore, the second statement will
by the Court. ld. at 1297.
143. ld. at 1308-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
145. [d.
146. ld.
147. ld.
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have to be examined to determine if it is admissible. Have
proper Miranda warnings been given to the defendant? If the
answer is yes, ordinarily this will be sufficient to cure the condition that was created by an inadvertant violation of Miranda,
and the defendant can make a knowing and intelligent waiver of
his constitutional rights.
The Court's decision ignored the psychological impact of a
first confession upon a defendant. By allowing the courts to use
a confession that has been obtained when a defendant is in a
compromised psychological state, the Supreme Court has undermined the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. In
addition, the fifth amendment has been further weakened by
employing the Miranda warnings to ensure that any subsequent
confession is used against a defendant; the Miranda warnings
were designed to ensure that fifth amendment rights are
honored. The Court should have used the analysis of attenuation, or alternatively, mandated that police officers give a supplemental warning that a first confession may be inadmissible
whenever Miranda is violated. This additional safeguard would
have guaranteed that a defendant's fifth amendment rights
would be scrupulously honored.
The result of this watering down of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination may lead to the eventual
overruling of Miranda. But, at the very least, the Elstad decision will lead to an increase in the complexity of criminal procedure. In the words of Justice O'Connor, there will be "a finespun
new doctrine on [fifth amendment litigation] complete with hair
splitting distinctions that currently plague our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."148
Marte J. Bassi*

148. New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2636 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring
and dissenting).
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987.
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